In the evolving political landscape of Bangladesh, the time has arrived for a critical reassessment of the role played by external powers, particularly the United States, and its implications for the Awami League. Recent developments suggest that the US is either withdrawing its influence over Muhammad Yunus or positioning him as a figurehead president with limited responsibilities aligned to American objectives. This maneuver appears to mark the completion of tasks essential to safeguarding US national interests in the region. These include upgrading CIA operations in Bangladesh, ensuring the safe extraction of former agents and allies who have protected American agendas for the past 17 years, and installing new operatives to maintain those interests in the coming decades. Such transitions are not unprecedented; a similar overhaul occurred 17 years ago, and the current apparatus has grown outdated. Numerous other covert activities, difficult to fully articulate or comprehend, have likely been part of this process.
To facilitate these operations, a stable and quiet environment was necessary, prompting the suppression of dissenting voices against Yunus. US-aligned propaganda mechanisms effectively silenced negative commentary, while mobs ostensibly protecting the Yunus regime were mobilized to maintain order. As these objectives near fulfillment, these protective elements are scaling back their activities, with some shifting focus toward parliamentary rewards. Consequently, space is gradually opening for the Awami League and ordinary citizens with diverse viewpoints to express themselves online. Even former Yunus supporters, who championed his narrative for the past two years, are now voicing criticisms of the regime. This shift underscores a fundamental truth: the US prioritizes only those individuals in Bangladesh who have safeguarded, or will safeguard, its interests—past, present, or future. The welfare of political entities like Jamaat-e-Islami or the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), or Bangladesh as a whole, is secondary at best.
From this analysis, it becomes evident that the barriers imposed by the US were never motivated by concern for Bangladesh or its people, but solely by self-interest. Whether the Awami League regains power or faces bans is immaterial to Washington. However, parallel to these geopolitical maneuvers, a darker undercurrent persists: widespread corruption, crimes, and murders that the Yunus regime fears most. Currently, no other active political party in Bangladesh is positioned to investigate these atrocities, as they occurred amid a facade of national unity, implicating broad swaths of the political spectrum. In this vacuum, the Awami League emerges as the sole entity capable of delivering justice.
Recognizing this vulnerability, the Yunus regime is attempting to co-opt the Awami League by offering electoral participation in exchange for an apology, effectively making the party complicit in these crimes. Accepting such terms would be a grave strategic error for the Awami League. Instead, the party should reject all negotiations with the regime and prepare for a counter-revolution. History demonstrates that only a revolution can dismantle another revolution. The path forward demands uniting the populace, presenting unvarnished facts, awakening them from complacency, and avoiding any traps laid by adversaries. Internally, the Awami League must purge elements that have alienated the public. Bangladeshis have endured the harsh consequences of Western interventions and are now primarily intimidated by mob violence. What they crave are leaders who inspire hope and provide a steadfast foundation upon which they can rebuild.
In conclusion, the Awami League’s survival and relevance hinge on a resolute commitment to these principles. By prioritizing justice, transparency, and genuine public engagement, the party can reclaim its role as a force for positive change in Bangladesh, free from external manipulations.